Sea and airborne weapons made killing from a distance more effective as well. Guns mounted on ships were able to strike targets up to twenty miles inland. The stealth and speed of German submarines gave Germany a considerable advantage in its dominance of the North Sea. Although airplanes were technologically crude, they offered a psychological advantage. Fighter pilot aces such as Manfred von Richthofen, Germany's "Red Baron," became celebrities and heroes, capturing the world's imagination with their daring and thrilling mid-air maneuvers.
Military leaders in the Middle Ages recognized that victims of infectious diseases could become weapons themselves (1). During the siege of Caffa, a well-fortified Genoese-controlled seaport (now Feodosia, Ukraine), in 1346, the attacking Tartar force experienced an epidemic of plague (3). The Tartars, however, converted their misfortune into an opportunity by hurling the cadavers of their deceased into the city, thus initiating a plague epidemic in the city. The outbreak of plague followed, forcing a retreat of the Genoese forces. The plague pandemic, also known as the Black Death, swept through Europe, the Near East, and North Africa in the 14th century and was probably the most devastating public health disaster in recorded history. The ultimate origin of the plague remains uncertain: several countries in the Far East, China, Mongolia, India, and central Asia have been suggested (5, 5).
Essay On Weapons Of World War 1
The Caffa incident was described in 1348 or 1349 by Gabriel de Mussis, a notary born in Piacenza north of Genoa (6). De Mussis made two important claims: plague was transmitted to the citizens of Caffa by the hurling of diseased cadavers into the besieged city, and Italians fleeing from Caffa brought the plague into the Mediterranean seaports (4). In fact, ships carrying plague-infected refugees (and possibly rats) sailed to Constantinople, Genoa, Venice, and other Mediterranean seaports and are thought to have contributed to the second plague pandemic. However, given the complex ecology and epidemiology of plague, it may be an oversimplification to assume that a single biological attack was the sole cause of the plague epidemic in Caffa and even the 14th-century plague pandemic in Europe (3). Nonetheless, the account of a biological warfare attack in Caffa is plausible and consistent with the technology of that time, and despite its historical unimportance, the siege of Caffa is a powerful reminder of the terrible consequences when diseases are used as weapons.
In December 1949, a Soviet military tribunal in Khabarovsk tried 12 Japanese prisoners of war for preparing and using biological weapons (15). Major General Kawashima, former head of Unit 731's First, Third, and Fourth Sections, testified in this trial that no fewer than 600 prisoners were killed yearly at Unit 731. The Japanese government, in turn, accused the Soviet Union of experimentation with biological weapons, referring to examples of B. anthracis, Shigella, and V. cholerae organisms recovered from Russian spies.
Although German medical researchers infected prisoners with disease-producing organisms such as Rickettsia prowazekii, hepatitis A virus, and malaria, no charges were pressed against Germany regarding experimentation with agents of biological warfare (1, 7). Allegedly Hitler issued orders prohibiting the development of biological weapons, referring to his own devastating experience with the effects of chemical agents used during World War I. However, with the support of other high-ranking Nazi officials, German scientists began biological weapons research (16). Despite these efforts, which clearly lagged behind those of other countries, a German offensive biological weapons program never materialized.
On the other hand, German officials accused the Allies of using biological weapons: Joseph Goebbels accused the British of attempting to introduce yellow fever into India by importing infected mosquitoes from West Africa (1). This was in fact believable by many, because the British were actually experimenting with at least one organism of biological warfare: B. anthracis. Bomb experiments of weaponized spores of B. anthracis were conducted on Gruinard Island near the coast of Scotland (17). These experiments lead to heavy contamination of the island with persistence of viable spores. In 1986, the island was finally decontaminated by using formaldehyde and seawater.
In addition to these efforts in the USA, many other countries continued their biological weapons research, including Canada, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. In the United Kingdom, the Microbiological Research Department was established in 1947 and expanded in 1951 (2, 21). Plans for pilot biological warfare were made, and research continued on the development of new biological agents and weapons design. Britain conducted several trials with biological warfare agents in the Bahamas, in the Isles of Lewis, and in Scottish waters to refine these weapons. However, in 1957, the British government decided to abandon the offensive biological warfare research and to destroy stockpiles. At that time, a new emphasis was put on further development of biological defensive research (21). At the same time, the Soviet Union increased its efforts in both offensive and defensive biological warfare research and development (1). Reports regarding offensive research repeatedly occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, although officially the Soviet Union claimed not to possess any biological or chemical weapons.
A 1995 report stated that the Russian program continued to exist after the 1979 incident and had temporarily increased during the 1980s. In 1995, the program was still in existence and employed 25,000 to 30,000 people (1). At the same time, several high-ranking officials in the former Soviet military and Biopreparat had defected to Western countries. The information provided by these former employees gave further insight into the biological weapons program of the former Soviet Union. After the anthrax incident in Sverdlovsk, the research was continued at a remote military facility in the isolated city of Stepnogorsk in Kazakhstan, producing an even more virulent strain of anthrax (1, 28). In 1980, the former Soviet Union expanded its bioweapons research program and was eventually able to weaponize smallpox. This research was conducted at remote facilities in Siberia, and very little information is available about the extent and outcome of this research and where it was conducted (1).
During Operation Desert Shield, the build-up phase of the Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) after Iraq had invaded and occupied Kuwait in the fall and winter of 1990, the USA and the coalition of allied countries faced the threat of biological and chemical warfare (2, 30). The experience gained from observations during the first Persian Gulf War in the late 1980s supported the information on biological and chemical weapons available to the Western intelligence community. In fact, Iraq had used chemical warfare against its own people on many occasions in the 1980s (1). Intelligence reports from that time suggested that the Iraqi regime had sponsored a very ambitious biological and chemical warfare program.
At the end of the Persian Gulf War in August 1991, the first UN inspection of Iraq's biological warfare capabilities was carried out. Representatives of the Iraqi government announced to representatives from the UN Special Commissions Team 7 that Iraq had conducted research into the offensive use of B. anthracis, botulinum toxins, and Clostridium perfringens (30). Iraq had extensive and redundant research facilities at Salman Pak, Al Hakam, and other sites, only some of which were destroyed during the war (1, 30). Despite these elaborate efforts by the UN, the struggle with enforcement of the BWC continued throughout the late 1990s and into the 21st century. As the recent developments in Iraq have shown, development of biological and chemical weapons is a real threat, and efforts to control its proliferation are limited by logistical and political problems. As long as there are no concrete provisions for enforcement, the BWC will remain a toothless instrument in the hands of the UN Security Council.
In addition to these state-sponsored and military-related biowarfare programs, private and civilian groups have attempted to develop, distribute, and use biological and chemical weapons. One incident was the intentional contamination of salad bars in restaurants in Oregon by the Rajneeshee cult during late September 1984 (7, 28). A total of 751 cases of severe enteritis were reported, and Salmonella typhimurium was identified as the causative organism. Forty-five victims were hospitalized during this outbreak. Although the Rajneeshees were suspected, the extensive research and investigation conducted by the Oregon Health Department and the Centers for Disease Control could not conclusively identify the origin of the epidemic. However, in 1985, a member of the cult confirmed the attack and identified the epidemic as a deliberate biological attack (28).
Biowarfare attacks are now a possibility. The medical community as well as the public should become familiar with epidemiology and control measures to increase the likelihood of a calm and reasoned response if an outbreak should occur. In fact, the principles that help clinicians develop strategies against diseases are relevant as the medical community considers the problem of biological weapons proliferation. For the medical community, further education focusing on recognition of this threat is both timely and necessary.
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The German High Command sanctioned the use of gas in the hope that this new weapon would bring a decisive victory, breaking the enduring stalemate of trench warfare. However, their faith in this wonder weapon was limited. Surprised by the apparent success of the attack, and having no plan to send a large offensive force in after the gas, the Germans were unable to take advantage of the situation. Within days, both armies once again faced each other from the same opposing fortifications. The attack that spring day, nonetheless, marked a turning point in military history, as it is recognized as the first successful use of lethal chemical weapons on the battlefield. 2ff7e9595c